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CASE COMMENTS
race, and therefore violated the 14th Amendment. Although this
case was referred to in the principal case, it was not followed because the court believed it to be based on a misinterpretation of
recent Supreme Court decisions in Oyama v. California, 332 U.S.
633 (1948), and Takahasi v. Fish &eGame Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410
"(1948).
The decision in the principal case by the California district
court is unique in that it is the first time a law in the United States
has been declared unenforceable by virture of the United Nations
Charter. What the outcome of the case will be if it is appealed
is, of course, a matter of conjecture. However, if the decision is
carried to its logical conclusion, an interesting problem arises.
Does the holding mean that upon ratification of the Charter all
discriminatory practices in the United States became illegal? It
could be argued that if the Charter is a self-executing treaty many
of the provisions of the proposed Civil Rights legislation, aimed
at preventing discrimination, became effective upon its ratification.
It is unlikely that anything of this nature was contemplated by the
Senate when it ratified the Charter. The necessity for legislation
to provide machinery for enforcement and penalties for the violation of the Charter provision, would tend to show that it is not
self-executing on this point.
A possible solution to this problem might be reached by
holding the Charter to be self-executing in relation to the California statute since further legislation is unnecessary; but executory
in relation to the Civil Rights program since enabling legislation
is necessary. On the former point, no positive action is required,
R. E .M.
while in the latter case it is.

HABEAS

CORPus-FEDERAL

COURTS-CERTIORARI

TO

UNITED

REMEDY.-Petitioner was denied
a writ of habeas corpus by the district court because of his failure
to apply for certiorari to the United States Supreme 'Court after
the state supreme court had squarely passed on a federal constitutional question presented. Held, on certiorari, affirmed. Certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court is a part of the state remedies
under § 2254 of the Habeas Corpus Chaptcr of the judicial Code,
62 STAT. 967 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1948). Darr v. Burford, 70
Sup. Ct. 587 (1950) (5-3 decision).
STATES SUPREME COURT AS A STATE
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Section 2254 provides that one detained under the judgment
of a state court will not be granted an application for a writ of
habeas corpus unless such' applicant has exhausted his state
remedies or unless there is either an absence of available state corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such
process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner. This section further provides that the applicant shall not be deemed to
have exhausted his state remedies if he has the right under the
law of the state to raise, by any available procedure, the question
presented. In the instant case no question of inadequate or ineffective remedies was presented, and the only question before the court
was whether certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was to
be considered as one of the state remedies within the meaning of
the statute.
The majority opinion of the principal case merely reaffirmed
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944). That case held that ordinarily an application for habeas corpus in the federal court by one
imprisoned under the judgment of a state court will not be entertained until all state remedies, including appellate remedies in the
state court and in the United States Supreme Court by appeal or
writ of certiorari, have been exhausted. The following cases are
cited as authority for this proposition: Tinsley v. Anderson, 171
U.S. 101 (1898); Urquhartv. Brown, 205 U.S. 179 (1907); United
States ex rel. Kennedy v. Tyler, 269 U.S. 13 (1925).
The last three mentioned cases merely hold that a lower court
ought not to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in habeas corpus
in favor of one held under state custody unless he has availed himself of his remedy to review the state court's judgment by a writ
of error from the United States Supreme Court. When those cases
were decided a writ of error was a writ of right. However, as was
pointed out by Justice Frankfurter in the dissent of the principal
case, "this jurisdictional situation was drastically changed by the
Act of September 6, 1916, 39 Stat. 726, and the Act of February 13,
1925, 43 Stat. 936. . . . After this shift from review as of right to
review by grace, it could no longer be said that a litigant forwent
his right to have this Court review and reverse a State court. The
right was gone. Only an opportunity-and a slim one-remained.
It completely misconceives the doctrine which required a case to
be brought to this Court by writ of error, because it was the duty
of this Court to adjudicate the claim on the merits, to apply it to
the totally different factors involved in certiorari." At 606.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol53/iss1/8

2

B.: Habeas Corpus--Federal Courts--Certiorari to United States Suprem
CASE COMMENTS
The majority in the principal case assumed that § 2254 was
declaratory of existing case law as expressed by the Hawk case,
supra. See Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D.
171 (1949) (Judge Parker was the chairman of the Judicial Committee which proposed this legislation).
Upon careful examination of § 2254 it will be seen that it
refers nowhere to certiorari to the United States Supreme Court
as a state remedy, but is more declaratory of the law as stated in
Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), which is the original case
establishing this doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies and which
neither refers to certiorari to the Supreme Court as a state remedy,
nor implies such.
Wade v. Mayo, 834 U.S. 672 (1948), decided after the enactment of § 2254, while recognizing that failure to apply for certiorari
might be relevant in determining whether a district court should
exercise its discretion and entertain an application for habeas
corpus, held that certiorari to the United States Supreme Court
is not a state remedy. Prior to the principal case this was the latest
case in point and because of its great appeal to reason it is hard to
see why the court overruled it.
It seems that the court has bent over backwards in applying
the doctrine of comity. This doctrine teaches that one court
should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until
courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already
cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon
the matter. The thought is that it is better that the United States
Supreme Court should have the first opportunity to overrule the
highest state court because of the delicate nature of this statefederal coordinate jurisdiction. Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176
(1884). This is better referred to as the Supreme Court's "first
crack" policy. Here is overlooked the fact that it will be even more
harmful to this delicate situation if the district court overrules the
state court after the United States Supreme Court has refused to
hear the case.
It should be noted that the majority of the court also failed to
recognize that this situation falls within the rule of wisdom, often
applied by the Supreme Court, whereby questions of local law and
local practice will not be decided in the Supreme Court but will be
submitted to the knowledgeable views of federal judges in the
various localities. Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565 (1947).
The principal case failed to state what weight should be given
to a previous denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme
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Court by the district courts when hearing the habeas corpus application of a person detained under state custody. While this point
was not squarely before the court, it would have been well for it to
take a stand on that issue in view of the recent holding in Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 163 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1947). This court held
that although a denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court is not res judicata upon one subsequently filing for habeas
corpus in the district court, yet it is a matter to be taken into consideration by the district court and in the absence of some unusual
situation is sufficient reason for that court to deny the writ of habeas
corpus. In this case the court in effect gave a denial of certiorari
substantially the same weight as if the case had been heard by the
Supreme Court on its merits. Thus the clear right of the prisoner
to the great writ of freedom was lost and the result of the case
unjustified as the court failed to apply, although it considered, the
settled rule that a denial of certiorari has no legal significance.
1
House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945).
S. F. B.

MINES AND MINERALS-STRIP-MINING

RIGHTS-CoNsTRUCTION

OF

$5,615 the surface of 265 acres of land and
leased to D, owner of an underlying twelve-acre tract of coal, the
strip-mining rights for $3,000. The lease gave D the right "to do
any and all acts which are necessary or convenient for the mining
LEASE.-P purchased for

and removal of all said coal, and by way of enlargement . . . the
further right to mine, remove, and market all of said coal . . . with-

out any liability whatsoever from damages that may arise from the
removal of any or all of said coal, or the surface or subsurface or
other strata overlying the, same, or such additional parts of said
surface as.may be necessary or convenient in connection therewith
.... (Italics supplied.) In a suit by P for an injunction and damages for the conversion of ten truck loads (fifty tons) of soil, stone
and shale which D took from the premises to construct a roadway or
ramp to his tipple which was located off the leased premises, the
lower court rejected D's contention that the taking was authorized
by the contract. Held, that the money payment evidences consideration for very broad mining rights. Thus the materials removed
from the premises for the purpose of constructing a road or ramp
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